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The Psychology of Bias: From Data to Theory 
Chapter Overview: What’s going on in the head of someone with an implicit bias? Attempts to 
answer this question have centered on two problems: first, how to explain why implicit biases 
diverge from explicit attitudes and second, how to explain why implicit biases change in 
response to experience and evidence in ways that are sometimes rational, sometimes irrational. 
Chapter 1 introduces data, methods, and theories to help us think about these questions. First, the 
chapter briefly outlines the features of good, explanatory psychological theories built on 
empirical data, and the pitfalls they must avoid. Next, it presents an overview of the empirical 
data relevant to two main questions: implicit-explicit divergence and rationality. Finally, it 
surveys the theories intended to provide psychological explanations for those empirical data, 
providing examples of each. The chapter ends with some summarizing reflections, and in 
particular it confronts the possibility that bias is in fact a mixed-bag of many different sorts of 
psychological phenomena, making one unified psychological explanation misplaced.  
1. Introduction  
What’s going on in the head of someone with an implicit bias?  Often psychologists answer this 
question by saying such a person has an unconscious mental association. On this view, when we 
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say someone has an implicit bias against the elderly, for example, we’re saying they quickly, 
automatically, and unconsciously associate someone’s being elderly with, say, that person’s 
being frail, forgetful, or bad with computers. This view of implicit bias comes very naturally 
to us, as we’re used to our minds making associations quickly, automatically, and without our 
conscious awareness. For example, when I say salt, you automatically think pepper; or when I 
say hip, you think hop; when I say Tweedledee, you think … . You don’t need to deliberate 
about what comes next; you just know. These characteristics of the associationist picture may 
help us explain one of the most vexing aspects of implicit bias: divergence. Divergence occurs 
when our unconscious mental states differ, or diverge, from our consciously-held mental states. 
Consider, for example, an individual who, when asked, says women are just as capable of 
succeeding in leadership roles as men are but continues to act in ways that seem at odds with that 
sentiment. They might, for example, rate a male applicant for a leadership role more favorably 
than a female applicant with equally impressive credentials. In this case, we say that this 
individual’s explicit (or consciously accessible) beliefs about gender diverge from their implicit 
attitudes. At the conscious level, the person believes men and women are equally capable; 
however, at the implicit level, the person has a bias against women.  
The associationist view provides a natural explanation for divergence: this person’s 
conscious beliefs diverge from their unconscious beliefs because there are two distinct and 
independent mental constructs involved at each level of consciousness. At the conscious level, 
this person has deliberately considered evidence and is convinced that men and women are 
equal. However, at the unconscious level, this person’s automatic, reflex-like processes lead 
them to associate male with leader. Because distinct and independent constructs operate at each 
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level, we get different results depending on which level the individual relies on at any given 
time. I call this approach, which distinguishes between different kinds of states or processes for 
explicit and implicit attitudes, a dual-construct model. Dual-construct models excel at explaining 
divergence, or the differences between explicit and implicit attitudes.  
Dual-construct models—like the associationist picture above—have gained favor among 
psychological accounts of implicit biases. However, more recently, interesting studies exploring 
the malleability of implicit biases—that is, our ability to change implicit attitudes—suggest that 
the operation of mental processes at the two levels might not be so different after all. In 
particular, our implicit attitudes sometimes change when confronted with reasons to do so. I’ll 
call this newly emerging data rationality of bias, or rationality for short.  
The term ‘rationality’ is intended as a term of art here, which I’ll use to pick out 
particular features of mental states that I’ll explain in more detail later. This notion of rationality 
is intentionally more robust than you might initially think when hearing the term. For example, 
you might think that my having an association between salt and pepper is rational—it makes 
sense that I would think of one right after the other since they often appear together. However, 
this sort of superficial rationality won’t be enough to capture the unique features I want this 
technical notion to capture. I’ll return to this point and explain exactly what unique features I 
have in mind in section 3.3.  
The possibility that implicit biases might ever be rational, albeit rarely, is surprising for 
the dual-construct model, which predicts that rational and deliberative processes are unique to 
the explicit level and, thus, entirely absent at the implicit level. Even stronger, the fact that 
rational processes might be in operation at both the explicit and implicit levels suggests that the 
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dual-construct model, which attributes to each level distinct and independent kinds of states and 
processes, might be mistaken. Instead, one might think the evidence for rationality suggests that 
implicit attitudes are just like, or at least similar to, ordinary explicit beliefs, save for one kind of 
belief is unconscious while the other is conscious. I’ll call these sorts of approaches belief-based 
models, because they equate the kinds of constructs leading to explicit and implicit attitudes. 
Belief-based models excel at explaining rationality, or similarities between explicit and implicit 
attitudes.  
In this chapter, I discuss these two fact patterns—divergence and rationality—in detail. I 
begin by reviewing standard assumptions about psychological theories more generally, such as 
what they aim to do and how we evaluate them. Following this preliminary discussion, I review 
the empirical data indicating patterns of divergence and rationality, and I examine how the two 
main approaches—dual-construct models and belief-based models—are each sufficient to deal 
with one of the fact patterns, but struggle to explain both. I’ll then look at views that attempt to 
carve out a middle ground between dual-construct and belief-based models. These views argue 
that implicit biases constitute a unique kind of mental construct, which is not easily explained by 
either standard dual-construct or belief-based models. 
2. What is a Psychological Explanation? 
Roughly, psychology is a scientific discipline that aims to explain an intelligent creature’s 
behavior in terms of that creature’s mental states and processes. In other words, psychologists 
look to a creature’s state of mind in order to understand why they acted the way that they did. 
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One fundamental assumption among most psychologists today is that humans have 
mental states that represent the world as being a certain way and that those representations of the 
world affect how they think and act in it. For example, you might explain your roommate’s going 
to Chipotle for lunch using her belief that Chipotle makes the best guacamole. Of course, this 
belief might turn out to be false or your roommate might have gone to Chipotle for a different 
reason. But the kind of explanation you gave is what psychologists understand and expect.  
This psychological methodology of building theories that explain by making reference to 
distinctively mental states—beliefs, desires, fears, intentions, etc.—is an example of what 
philosophers of science beginning with Thomas Kuhn (1962) call a paradigm. Within any 
paradigm, scientists take certain fundamental assumptions for granted as shared among members 
of a scientific community—in this case, the assumption that humans have mental states in the 
form of representations. 
Alternative to this methodological paradigm was a different approach made popular by 
B.F. Skinner called behaviorism. It claimed that psychology should only study objective, 
observable physical stimuli and behavioral responses, and not concern itself with subjective, 
private mental states. In its most radical form, behaviorism claimed that all behaviors of 
intelligent creatures can ultimately be explained in this way, without ever needing to mention 
internal, distinctively mental states. Although no longer popular, behaviorism made several 
important contributions to the methodology of psychology.  
One contribution is a general suspicion toward the ease of relying on mental state 
explanations (See Dennett 1978: 56 citing Skinner 1971: 195). The fear is that we can’t explain 
an unknown fact—why your roommate went to Chipotle for lunch—by using an equally 
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mysterious object—her internal belief about Chipotle. Because her belief is a mental state, it is 
observable only by her and no one else. So we weren’t really explaining anything at all, merely 
replacing one mysterious fact with another.  
This worry is sometimes called the ‘homunculus fallacy’. The word ‘homunculus’ (plural 
‘homunculi’) is Latin for ‘little person’. A theory that commits this fallacy attempts to explain 
some intelligent behavior by way of positing some equally intelligent cause of that behavior. The 
idea is that this was tantamount to positing a little person inside the head of the first intelligent 
creature whose own behavior goes unexplained.  
This same basic idea is depicted humorously in the 2015 Pixar film Inside Out. In this 
film, the perspective switches between that of a young girl, Riley, and the five personifications of 
the basic emotions that live in her head: Joy, Sadness, Fear, Disgust, and Anger. These five little 
people (or homunculi) inside Riley’s head operate a control center that influences all of Riley’s 
actions. According to the film, the explanation for why Riley acted the way she did—for 
example, why, when her parents feed her broccoli, she frowns, gags, and swats the vegetable 
away—is that there is a little person in her head prompting those reactions. In this case, Disgust 
finds broccoli disgusting.  
If you’re like me, you might ask: if we looked into the head of these little people, would 
there be more, even smaller people inside their heads? Of course, the film never shows us what’s 
inside any of their heads. You might then wonder if the film has really provided any explanation 
of Riley’s actions, or if instead it has merely pushed the explanation of her behavior back a level. 
We can apply a point made by Skinner (1971: 19) and say the whole purpose of introducing the 
little people seems to be to help us understand why Riley acts how she does. But without 
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providing an explanation of why the little people in Riley’s head act the way they do, we’ve 
failed to explain anything.  
Over time, behaviorism itself was criticized for purporting to provide explanations 
without actually doing so, and there was a return to theories that unabashedly allowed for 
reference to mental states (Fodor 1981: 6). On such views, the way to avoid the homunculus 
fallacy is to slowly replace complex mental phenomena with combinations of simpler, more 
intelligible mental phenomena (Fodor 1968: 629). The hope is that eventually we arrive at an 
analysis constituted entirely by simple, elementary states (for example, thoughts and concepts) 
and the processes that combine them (for example, logical rules). We’ll call any collection of 
states and processes that enters into such an analysis a mental construct. Crucially, the 
explanation of how these states operate can be given without any reference to intelligent 
behavior.  
And thus we return to the modern-day paradigm that explains behavior by reference to 
mental states. This paradigm has come to dominate theories of cognitive science and psychology, 
and is tacitly present in the theories of bias to follow. However, we should not forget the lessons 
of behaviorism. You should continue to ask yourself as we move through the theories: has this 
explanation rendered important parts of the psychological picture more understandable, or has it 
merely posited a convenient, but equally mysterious mental process? In other words, has it 
provided a genuine explanation or has it merely pushed the entire explanation back a level to 
equally intelligent homunculus-like states? 
3. Empirical Data of Social Bias 
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At the onset of our investigation, we’re faced with several questions. What are the data 
surrounding social bias? In what ways do methods of testing for social bias differ from one 
another? What patterns emerge from these data?  
3.1 Direct and Indirect Measures 
Before the early 1970s, tests for social bias took a direct route: if a psychologist wanted to know 
if someone had a bias against a particular social group, she would ask her subjects directly. Such 
tests are called direct measures. Let’s focus on the case of racial attitudes in the United States. 
One of the earliest examples of a direct measure was a test created by Katz & Braly (1933) that 
asked 100 Princeton students to read through a list of 84 adjectives and write down those that 
they think best characterized a particular race or ethnicity. Characteristic of the time, the results 
indicated pervasive negative racial biases. The majority of participants in the study paired 
African Americans with traits like superstitious and lazy, while pairing Germans with traits like 
scientifically-minded and industrious.  
Over time, the social landscape of the United States changed dramatically. The Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s strived to establish racial equality across the country, and 
ushered in a new public standard that discriminatory opinions about African Americans were 
socially unacceptable. During this time, direct measures began to show a decline in negative 
racial bias. However, although overt expressions of racist ideology were curbed, the pervasive 
and destructive effects of racism were still painfully evident. It seemed that people still harbored 
racist opinions, opinions that influenced their beliefs about and actions toward people of color; 
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it’s just that either those individuals stopped wanting to admit those opinions to others or, more 
curiously, those opinions were not obvious even to them.  
This prompted the emergence of indirect measures (sometimes called “implicit” 
measures) that do not rely on asking subjects to report their attitudes. Today, the most famous 
and widely-used indirect measure is the Implicit Association Task (IAT) first developed by 
Greenwald et al. (1998). (The following discussion will attempt to describe the test in detail. 
However, the easiest way to understand how the test operates is to take it for yourself, which you 
can do online at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ in the span of approximately 10 minutes.) 
The IAT asks participants to quickly sort stimuli appearing in the middle of a computer screen to 
either the left or the right depending on the categories on each side. There are always two 
categories on either side, forming compound categories for each side, but the compound 
categories change during the test.  
For example, in race IATs, compound categories combine race categories, e.g., black and 
white, with valences, e.g., good and bad. The stimuli to be sorted into these compound categories 
are representations of members of one of those four categories: photos of black faces, photos of 
white faces, positively-valenced words like ‘happy’ or ‘love,’ and negatively-valenced words like 
‘sad’ or ‘hate.’ Subjects are asked to complete several rounds or “blocks” of these sorting tasks, 
with the compound categories changing from round to round. The congruent blocks of sorting 
tasks combine race categories with their stereotypical valence categories: with “black and bad” 
on one side and “white and good” on the other. In the incongruent blocks, the stereotypical 
attribute categories are swapped: “black and good” on one side and “white and bad” on the other. 
The tests also switch the sides of the congruent and incongruent categories on different rounds, 
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attempting to eliminate any dominant-hand advantage in certain blocks, as well as to randomize 
the order in which the incongruent and congruent blocks are presented, attempting to eliminate 
any conditioning effects from getting used to the test.  
The results of these tasks reveal that most Americans, including some African Americans, 
are quicker and make fewer mistakes (e.g., sorting to the wrong side) when sorting stimuli in the 
congruent blocks (See, for example, Banaji & Greenwald 2013: 47 and Axt et al. 2014: 1806). 
I’ll call results of this sort demonstrating a positive preference toward white faces or 
demonstrating a negative preference toward black faces. (These labels don’t make any 
assumptions about individuals’ psychologies. They are just about the behavioral responses: 
whether a given participant paired African American faces faster and more accurately with 
positive words, negative words, or—as is true for some participants—neither.) 
Now the key question motivating psychological theories of bias is this: what’s going on 
inside the head of someone who demonstrates a positive preference toward White faces on an 
IAT? The favored response among the creators of the test is that it measures specific mental 
constructs where the states involved are simple concepts and the relevant process is association. 
In the case of the Race IAT, the test measures whether particular race concepts are associated 
with valence concepts. Just like in the salt and pepper example mentioned in the introduction, 
what it means for the racial concept black to be associated with the valence concept bad is just 
for mental activations of the concept black to reliably cause mental activations of the concept 
bad. That is, when you think of one (the concept activates), you think of the other (the other 
concept activates). Crucially, this theory assumes that two concepts being associated makes it 
easier to sort examples of them together, and harder to sort examples of each separately. So, if 
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black is associated with bad, then it will be easier to sort examples of black faces (which 
activate the concept black) and examples of negative words (which activate the concept bad) to 
the same side than to opposite sides, and the same will be true of white faces and positive words 
if their concepts are associated. 
There are other examples of indirect measures, for example semantic priming (Banaji and 
Hardin 1996) and evaluative priming (Fazio et al. 1995), the Go/No-Go Associations Task 
(Nosek and Banaji 2001), the Sorting Paired Features Task (Bar-Anan et al. 2009), the Weapons 
Identification Task (Correll et al. 2002), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer 2003), 
and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et al. 2005). But roughly, all of these tests rely on 
similar theoretical assumptions: that certain behavioral patterns (like quick sorting) occur as a 
result of the subjects’ mental constructs being composed a certain way (like being made up of 
associated concepts).  
With the basics of direct and indirect measures out of the way, we’re now in a position to 
explore various patterns that emerge in the data they provide.  
3.2 Divergence 
Our first fact pattern is divergence: results of indirect measures are often at odds with, i.e., 
diverge from, results of direct measures for the same subject. In what follows, I’ll explain two 
ways in which results of these measures diverge. The discussion that follows focuses only on 
empirical data, namely, observations of behavior; we will discuss psychological theories that 
attempt to explain that data in the following section. As we advance through the observational 
evidence, however, it will be a fruitful exercise for readers to hypothesize about plausible 
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explanations, and then weigh their hypotheses against the psychological models presented in 
subsequent sections. 
Reportability 
The first aspect of divergence is the most striking. It involves an individual’s ability to report on 
the results of indirect and direct tests. Early explorations of implicit bias suggested that subjects 
who demonstrated a positive white preference on indirect measures could not report harboring 
preferences or aversions that would explain such behavior. In fact, when people were confronted 
with the fact that their indirect measure results indicated bias, many avowed egalitarians 
expressed shock and disbelief. In their book Blindspot, Mahzarin Banaji and Tony Greenwald 
report several instances of the “disturbing” feeling one gets when confronted with the IAT 
evidence indicating an implicit bias (Banaji and Greenwald 2013: 56-58). These cases include a 
gay activist who finds out he harbors negative associations toward the gay community and a 
writer whose mother is Jamaican finding out he harbors pro-White biases, stating the revelation 
was “creepy”, “dispiriting”, and “devastating.” Even the authors report the first-personal shock 
of finding out they have biases. Banaji’s experience is described as “one of [her] most significant 
self-revelations” (Banaji and Greenwald 2013: 57). 
However, the claim that individuals are always unable to predict their results of indirect 
tests has received criticism. Some empirical studies indicate that when participants were pressed 
to offer a prediction about how they will perform on an indirect test, their predictions were 
mostly accurate (Hahn et al. 2014). In addition, other studies have shown that when interviewed 
after an IAT, most subjects could accurately report how they fared on the test and, moreover, 
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many attributed their biased IAT performance to racial or stereotypical associations (Monteith et 
al. 2001: 407). In some studies, merely telling subjects to attend to their “gut feelings” was 
enough to increase their predictions of biased results (Hahn and Gawronski 2019). 
Motivational and Social Sensitivity 
The second way in which results on indirect and direct tests appear to diverge involves 
motivational and social sensitivity. 
Regarding motivation, studies demonstrate that the more a subject describes themselves 
as motivated, the more their pro-white results from direct tests, e.g., self-reports, goes down 
while results from indirect tests, e.g., IATs, remain unchanged. To demonstrate this, researchers 
conducted a trio of tests (Fazio et al. 1995). In addition to a timed indirect measure somewhat 
similar to the IAT called the Evaluative Priming Task (EPT) and a direct measure, researchers 
provided a third set of questions gauging how motivated the subjects were to avoid being 
prejudiced or appearing prejudiced to others.  
The researchers found that the correlation between subjects’ performances on the indirect 
measure and their scores on the direct measure varied depending on how high they indicated 
their motivation to appear non-prejudiced was (Fazio et al. 1995: 1024). In situations where they 
claimed to be not highly motivated, their results from indirect and direct measures matched up 
(either both exhibited a preference or neither did). In situations where the subjects claimed they 
were highly motivated, their results on the other two tasks were often mismatched, with the 
results on the direct measure often indicating no preference, and the results of the indirect 
measure indicating a positive white preference. 
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Similar results were found with respect to the social sensitivity of the subject matter. 
When researchers such as Greenwald et al. (2009) and Kurdi et al. (2018) produced meta-
analyses—taking a large group of studies about the correlation between direct and indirect 
measures and analyzing their overall average effects—they found that direct measures correlate 
with results from indirect measures differently depending on how socially sensitive the topic is. 
For example, for topics that are not socially sensitive, like consumer preference, subjects’ direct 
and indirect preferences align, whereas for topics that are socially sensitive, like gender and 
sexual orientation preferences, their direct and indirect preferences were much less correlated.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding from these studies, and a crucial aspect of 
divergence, is about predictive validity. Researchers use the term predictive validity to pick out 
the degree to which they’re able to predict some phenomenon on the basis of some other 
phenomenon. In the case of implicit bias, many researchers are interested in predictive validity 
between direct and indirect measures on the one hand and real-world discriminatory behavior on 
the other. Meta-analyses differ about the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures. 
Greenwald and colleagues found that, on topics where indirect and direct measure results 
diverge, self-reports of racial bias showed lower correlations with biased behavior compared to 
correlations between IAT scores and biased behavior.  
All meta-analyses of the predictive power of direct and indirect measures score both 
measures in the “small” to “small-to-medium” range.  Even critics of the IAT grant that it has 
some predictive power, but the question of amount is a matter of ongoing debate and research 
(Brownstein, this volume; Brownstein et al. 2019). Importantly, many studies appear to support 
the predictive validity of IAT and other indirect measures. Real-world examples of this predictive 
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validity include results from a Swedish study presented by Rooth (2007), which found that 
discriminatory hiring practices for applicants with Arab/Muslim sounding names were well 
predicted by IAT measures. Additionally, studies presented by Jacoby-Senghor and colleagues 
(2016) and Fazio and colleagues (1995) indicated that subjects’ results from indirect measures 
correlate well with their perceived friendliness toward African Americans. Moreover, similar 
results have been seen with respect to racial biases in the treatment of patients by emergency 
room and resident physicians (Green et al. 2007) and racial biases in the accuracy of simulated 
shooting tasks (Payne 2001). (However, again, some critics argue that these results are 
exaggerated. See Brownstein, this volume, and Brownstein et al. 2019.) 
Before moving on to the theories that attempt to resolve the puzzle of divergence, I first 
want to examine the other major fact pattern in the empirical data: the puzzle of the rationality of 
bias. 
3.3 Rationality of Bias 
As with the puzzle of divergence, the puzzle of rationality is multifaceted. This puzzle arises 
from data suggesting that results from indirect tests can actually be manipulated based on what 
I’ll call rational interventions. A rational intervention is an attempt to intervene on a person’s 
implicit attitudes that relies on the informational content of the intervention, i.e., the reasons they 
present, rather than mere repeated exposure to the intervention (known in psychology as “classic 
conditioning”). The two indications of rationality for bias that we’ll focus on are responsiveness 
to the rational interventions of simple instructions and strength of evidence.  
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Sensitivity to Simple Instructions 
Initially it seemed like intensive training was necessary to change how people performed on 
indirect measures, indicating that change was a result of conditioning rather than rational 
intervention (See, for example, Kawakami et al. 2000). However, recent studies have shown that 
some indirect measure results can be changed by one-off, simple instructions, indicating that 
changes might be the result of more rational interventions after all.  
The first relevant study involves an experiment presented by Gregg et al. (2006: 9; 
additionally discussed in Mandelbaum 2015: 15-17.) In this experiment, participants were given 
hypothetical narratives about two fictional tribes. The narrative about the first tribe was positive 
while the narrative about the second was negative. Participants were then given an IAT, the 
results of which indicated that participants demonstrated a positive preference toward the first 
tribe and demonstrated a negative preference toward the second. Experimenters then did 
something strange: they told the participants that due to an unforeseen error (like computer 
malfunction), participants had been given incorrect information about the two tribes. Participants 
were then instructed to swap the previous narrative assignments. Participants were then asked to 
retake the IAT. Surprisingly, the results exhibited a shift: subjects still demonstrated a positive 
preference toward the first tribe, but to a far lesser degree than before the intervention 
(Mandelbaum 2015: n.21; See also De Houwer 2006a; 2014). 
Sensitivity to Strength of Argument 
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A second common data pattern cited by theorists interested in the puzzle of rationality is the 
relationship between results on indirect measures and the strength of evidence being presented to 
subjects. 
The most relevant study for this point is presented by Brinol et al. (2009; additionally 
discussed in Mandelbaum 2015: 12-13). Here, researchers present two experiments aimed at 
testing this relationship, one involving vegetable preferences and one involving race. In the 
experiments, participants were split into groups and presented with one of two arguments—a 
strong argument or a weak argument—in favor of some conclusion regarding the benefit of the 
target stimulus. For example, in the experiment involving attitudes toward vegetables, one group 
of participants was given a persuasive argument (regarding the beneficial health effects of diets 
that include vegetables) while the other group was given an unpersuasive argument (regarding 
the popularity of vegetables at weddings). The participants were also given IATs before and after 
being exposed to the arguments. Interestingly, only those participants that were exposed to the 
strong arguments demonstrated any change in IAT performance (demonstrations of positive 
preference toward vegetables were increased). The experiment with arguments involving race 
showed similar results. 
4. Theories 
Now that we’ve seen the data for social bias, new questions emerge. How can we explain these 
results? What is the best way to explain why indirect measures diverge from explicit measures? 
If implicit biases are just associations, then why does performance on indirect measures 
sometimes shift in apparently rational ways? 
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4.1 Dual-Construct Theories 
According to dual-construct theories, we can explain the differences between direct and indirect 
measure responses by positing separate mental constructs that independently give rise to results 
on each kind of test. Let’s call the mental constructs that give rise to results of indirect measures 
like the IAT results implicit constructs, and the mental constructs that give rise to results of direct 
measures like self-reports explicit constructs.  
Consider again the first quality of divergence, reportability. One hypothesis for why 
subjects can report on their results of direct tests but not indirect tests is that they have conscious 
access to their explicit constructs, but not their implicit constructs. Psychologists and 
philosophers disagree about whether implicit constructs are really unconscious or just not always 
noticed, which would explain the data that subjects are not always incapable of predicting and 
reporting IAT results (De Houwer 2006b: 14-16; Fazio and Olson 2003: 302-303; and Holroyd 
and Sweetman 2016: 80-81). Even if they are somewhat conscious, they might be less easy to 
access consciously and to report on than explicit constructs, which still accounts for the 
divergence in reportability.  
Adopting a dual-construct theory similarly helps explain the other quality of divergence: 
motivational and social sensitivity. First, it seems reasonable to assume these are two versions of 
the same phenomenon—socially sensitive contexts are a kind of motivational context because 
subjects are motivated to be and to appear egalitarian (i.e., to value equal treatment for members 
of different social groups). We can then explain the relevant differences by postulating dual 
constructs: deliberate explicit constructs and automatic implicit constructs. In situations where a 
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subject is highly motivated to express egalitarian attitudes, their motivation can influence the 
operation of deliberative constructs, but they have no control over automatic constructs. Notice 
also how this explanation and the previous one about unconsciousness relate to one another: the 
control someone has over some mental construct might be affected by the degree to which 
they’re consciously aware of it. 
Let’s walk through an example of a dual-construct model. The Associative-Propositional 
Evaluation (APE) Model presented in Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006; 2014a; 2014b) is one 
of the most developed dual-construct models. (For another example of the dual-construct 
approach, see Fazio and Olson’s MODE model, presented in Fazio 1990 and Fazio and Olson 
2003.) The theory suggests that implicit constructs and explicit constructs involve two distinct 
processes: associative processes and propositional processes, respectively.  
Imagine Sounak sees his elderly neighbor Carol for the first time. When his mother asks 
him what he thinks of his new neighbor, he responds that he likes her and is happy to have an 
elderly individual in the neighborhood. However, some of his behaviors indicate he’s less warm 
to the idea; for example, he tends to cross the street whenever he sees Carol outside. According 
to the APE model, although his explicitly held beliefs indicate his warm feeling toward Carol, his 
mental associations tell a different story. 
According to APE, when Sounak sees Carol, this activates the concept elderly in his 
mind. This associative activation then spreads by way of associative processes to other mental 
concepts, e.g., wise, frail, and forgetful might all activate. Some of these concepts might have a 
positive valence (like being wise), but some of them might have a negative valence (like being 
frail). Some of Sounak’s responses, like his crossing the street, are a direct result of these 
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valences. Since the overall valence of the activating concepts is negative (wise is positive, while 
frail and forgetful are negative), Sounak has what Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2014b: 449) call 
a negative “spontaneous evaluative response.” This response is what causes him to cross the 
street; it’s also what is measured by indirect measures like the IAT.  
But what about his report to his mother that he’s glad Carol moved to the neighborhood? 
APE is able to account for these responses, too. According to the model, the overall valence of 
the activating concepts goes through another process called propositionalization, which produces 
in Sounak a sentence-like thought of the form “I don’t like Carol.” This thought is treated more 
deliberatively than the spontaneous evaluative response is. Crucially, this thought is evaluated 
against all of Sounak’s background beliefs, which include things like his belief that he likes 
elderly individuals and that Carol is an elderly individual. Of course, if he likes elderly 
individuals and Carol is an elderly individual, then it stands to reason that he likes Carol, making 
this new thought “I don’t like Carol” inconsistent with his other beliefs. So, according to APE, he 
rejects this new sentence-like thought while leaving intact his background beliefs that indicate 
he’s glad an elderly individual moved to the neighborhood. This is what leads to divergence: his 
mental concepts and associative processes that lead to the spontaneous response (i.e., the implicit 
construct) indicate a negative response toward Carol, while his sentence-like thoughts and 
propositional processes that lead to his rejection of the thought that he dislikes Carol (i.e., the 
explicit construct) indicate a positive response toward Carol.  
APE is tailormade to reflect the ways that motivation and social sensitivity lead to 
divergence. It claims that the more socially sensitive the domain, the more likely people are to 
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engage in deliberative processes, whereas socially insensitive domains rely on the spontaneous, 
non-deliberative processes. 
4.2 Belief-Based Theories 
Belief-based theories take as their primary data the apparent rationality of results on both 
indirect and direct tests and claim these similarities occur because the underlying constructs for 
each are of the same belief-like type, namely, both are sentence-like structures that involve 
rational processing.   
One of the most developed and popular versions of this view in social psychology is 
named ‘the propositional model,’ where proposition is a representation with a sentence-like 
structure (De Houwer 2014). This model has two core assumptions supporting the conclusion 
that implicit constructs involve rational processes and sentence-like representations: first, 
changes by rational interventions are the result of rational processes and second, only sentence-
like representations can be changed by rational processes. Since indirect measure results can be 
changed by rational interventions (as demonstrated by the rationality data), it follows that first, 
the constructs measured by them—implicit constructs—must involve rational processes (by 
assumption one), and second, that they must be composed of sentence-like representations (by 
assumption two). According to De Houwer (2014: 346), a sentence-like structure is necessary for 
representing relational information, and relational information is necessary for rational 
interventions. Since simple associations between concepts are not able to capture the relational 
information that sentence-like structures are able to capture, the processes performed on them 
cannot be rational. 
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This argument is complicated, and so running through an example will help. Consider a 
belief with the content Rahul loves Priya. This belief is propositional; its structure is sentence-
like. It also captures how Rahul and Priya are related. An association, remember, exists between 
concepts. So, the complex Rahul loves Priya would be a combination of three singular concepts 
Rahul, loves, and Priya, that are all associatively linked. But then the associationist model can’t 
distinguish between complexes that are built out of the same constituents but contain different 
relational information, for example Rahul loves Priya versus Priya loves Rahul. The relational 
information conveyed by these two complexes are very different. We form different rational 
conclusions depending on which we believe, and one might be true while the other is false (much 
to Rahul’s chagrin). So it’s important that we can distinguish between them. To do that, this 
theory argues, we need to combine the concepts in a particular order with a sentence-like 
structure. Mere associative bundles just won’t do.   
Because the associationist model can’t account for this difference, representations 
involved in rational processes can’t be modeled by associations. Since, as we’ve seen from the 
data, some implicit constructs are affected by rational interventions, then according to the 
assumptions of this theory, they must be sentence-like mental states rather than mere associations 
between concepts (see also Mandelbaum 2015).  
4.3 Problems 
Both dual-construct and belief-based theories excel at answering their fact patterns of choice; 
however, each falter in resolving the other’s preferred fact pattern. Dual-construct models do 
well in explaining divergence data, but run into difficulties in explaining rationality data due to 
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assuming that implicit constructs involve only associations. Likewise, belief-based models 
explain rationality with implicit constructs being sentence-like representations that respond to 
rational processes. However, if implicit biases are so belief-like, then why don’t they look like 
beliefs in many respects pertaining to divergence—that is, why would they be relatively 
unconscious or automatic in ways that our explicit beliefs are not? 
This is not to say that either theory cannot explain the other’s data. For example, 
proponents of the APE model claim it’s possible that some propositional information can affect 
spontaneous evaluative responses by a sort of “spillover" from the rational processes (Fazio and 
Olson 2003: 302). Likewise, proponents of the belief-based model can account for divergence by 
stipulating that the mind is made up of many conflicting, fragmented, and redundant sentence-
like thoughts, some of which are unconscious and automatic, some of which are not, and some of 
which cause positive reactions toward individuals while others cause negative reactions toward 
those same individuals (Mandelbaum 2015: 20-23.). 
The problem with these sorts of concessions, however, is that they appear ad-hoc. ‘Ad-
hoc’ applies to parts of theories “made up on the fly” when problematic evidence comes in, 
rather than predicted in advance. Consider a famous example studied by psychologist Leon 
Festinger and colleagues involving a doomsday cult that had predicted the end of the world by 
way of a great flood on December 21st, 1954. The prophecy stated that “the chosen” among the 
believers would be saved from the destruction of the flood at precisely midnight the evening 
before by a spaceman piloting a flying saucer, who would then escort them to safety. 
Unsurprisingly to us now, midnight came and passed with no arrival of a spacecraft. The flood 
also failed to come to fruition. When faced with the apparent disconfirmation of the prophecy, 
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rather than reasoning that the cult teachings were false, believers rationalized the failures as 
consistent with the cult teachings after all. They reasoned ad-hoc that it was due to the true 
faithfulness of the cult members themselves that the flood was avoided (Festinger et al. 1956). 
Perhaps the real trouble with concessions like these is that they appear to lack explanatory 
efficacy. Returning to theories of implicit bias, although it’s true that spillover effects, mixed 
processes, and fragmentation can result in the relevant fact patterns, none of these theories offer 
an account of why these effects occur when they do, they merely stipulate them by decree. 
Without filling in this story, these changes to the theories in order to account for both fact 
patterns are explanatorily inert, as in the homunculus fallacy discussed in section two. More and 
more research is investigating these questions and it’s important that research draw on theories to 
make predictions rather than trying to explain the data with 20/20 hindsight. 
5. Meeting in the Middle 
So far, we’ve looked at views of implicit bias that fit into two basic camps: dual-construct 
theories and belief-based theories—as well as the problems with each. In what remains, we will 
briefly survey views that attempt to carve out space in the middle. These views will often 
attribute to implicit bias constructs some characteristics that are shared by the familiar constructs 
discussed above (e.g., associations and beliefs), but also characteristics unique to implicit bias.  
5.1 Unique States and Processes 
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Some views attempt to carve out middle ground by treating implicit biases as being pretty similar 
to beliefs, but differing from them in important ways. I’ll begin by surveying prominent views of 
this type, then present a prominent criticism.  
One view that adopts the uniqueness approach is Schwitzgebel’s In-between belief view 
(2002, 2013). Schwitzgebel’s view is importantly different from the other views we’ve discussed 
in that it characterizes beliefs not in terms of their representational contents, but rather as 
tendencies to behave in various ways when faced with various physical stimuli (in this way, it’s 
similar to behaviorism, discussed in the second section). So, rather than viewing my belief that I 
should take the garbage out when it’s full as a mental state with the propositionally-structured 
content I should take the garbage out when it’s full, we instead view it as my tendency to take 
the garbage out when confronted with the overflowing can. But such a view can run into 
problems when faced with cases where an individual seems disposed to a mixed bag of 
behaviors. The data on divergence above is an example: often, individuals are disposed to act in 
ways that make it seem like they have one belief about members of a particular social group, but 
they’re also disposed to act in ways that make it seem like they harbor the opposite belief. 
(Recall also the case of Sounak and his elderly neighbor.) For these reasons, Schwitzgebel 
introduces the notion of in-between cases of believing for cases where it seems an individual 
doesn’t fully believe, but doesn’t not believe either (Schwitzgebel 2002, 260). Implicit biases, 
according to Schwitzgebel, are cases of in-between believing. (See also Levy 2015 and Machery 
2016, 2017.) 
Another, very different uniqueness approach is Tamar Gendler’s alief view (Gendler 
2008, 2011). Gendler argues that we cannot capture implicit constructs with any of the familiar 
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categories of psychological explanation, such as associations or beliefs. Instead, she argues, 
implicit constructs, as well as other “more deviant” arenas of human life, such as phobias and 
superstitions, should be explained by a new psychological kind called aliefs, which are a three-
part mix of thoughts, feelings, and behavioral impulses. When a person’s implicit bias construct 
is activated, then, that person not only has particular representational components activated (e.g., 
concepts like elderly and frail), but they’re also prone to experience certain feelings (like being 
sad or scared) as well as exhibit certain behaviors (like avoidance). These aliefs are often at odds 
with a person’s beliefs. (See her example of walking across the Grand Canyon on the transparent 
Skywalk: although you might believe that it’s safe, you might simultaneously alieve that it’s not.) 
Regarding implicit biases as aliefs, we might believe one thing regarding individuals of a 
particular social group, while also harboring a-rational aliefs that cause us to automatically 
exhibit behaviors diverging in various ways from the behaviors we would expect based on those 
beliefs. (See also Madva and Brownstein 2018 and Brownstein 2018.) 
The criticism often directed at uniqueness approaches is that they, like the additions to the 
associative and belief-based models above, appear ad-hoc. They deal with the problems above—
namely, that the collection of properties harbored by implicit bias constructs makes it so that they 
don’t neatly fit any models of standard, familiar mental constructs, like beliefs or associations—
by merely postulating a new kind of state that has all and only the relevant properties, and 
thereby, they fix the problem by fiat. Worries of the homunculus fallacy loom large here. That is, 
it’s not clear that postulating these unique states really explains the operation of implicit bias 
constructs rather than just pushing the explanation back a level. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
At this point, we’ve surveyed many views on the topic, all attempting to account for various 
aspects of implicit bias operation. In fact, more and more research is coming out on bias that 
continues to complicate the overall picture. As methods for studying bias become more 
sophisticated, so too does our understanding of how bias operates in the minds of individuals. 
Given the variety, readers might be skeptical that there is even a unified phenomenon to be 
studied under the heading of implicit bias research. Holroyd and Sweetman (2016) raise this 
possibility. If this is right, it would explain why some data surrounding implicit bias operation 
just can’t be explained using one, monolithic psychological explanation. Instead, we would need 
a variety of different theories.  
The purpose of psychological theorizing around implicit bias, then, would be to search 
for different explanations, describing in what instances they’re apt, investigating what, if 
anything, unifies them and, importantly, doing all this while ensuring that such explanations are 
genuinely explanatory. Such a view paints a picture of the psychology of bias in which there’s 
still a lot of work to be done; but leaves open that many of the views we’ve discussed here might 
eventually find a home together, constituting different and important aspects of the overall 
picture. 
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For an introduction to mental heuristics, system one vs system two, and more on the 
unconscious, automatic mind more generally.  
• Kahneman, Daniel 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Macmillan. 
  
A set of study questions or your article [*indicates recommended for book]: 
*What is a psychological explanation? Imagine that my roommate comes home from school, 
stomps across the living room to her bedroom, and slams the door. How might we explain her 
actions using mental representation paradigm? What objections would behaviorists make to this 
explanation? 
*What is the homunculi fallacy and why is it bad for psychological explanation? 
What’s the primary difference between indirect and direct measures for implicit bias? Why is it 
important to have indirect measures of bias? Do you think having indirect measures is less 
important in the study of preferences in other domains, like what kind of soda someone likes to 
drink or what genre of movie they like best? 
*In most of the psychological theories discussed, there was a focus on mental representations, 
i.e., mental states that represent the world as being a certain way. However, apart from Gendler’s 
Alief model, there was very little talk about other mental states, like affective or emotional states, 
that might affect how biases operate. How might these fit into the model we’ve discussed so far? 
Do you think they’re an important aspect of how we think about and act toward others? 
*We’ve been talking about the processes subserving implicit bias as a self-contained mental 
construct. One of the great criticisms of behaviorism, however, is that it cannot account for 
mental interaction, that is effects that are the joint result of many mental causes. So, try to think 
about implicit bias in the context of a complete psychology that has perceptions, inferences, 
actions, desires, problem-solving abilities, is embodied, etc. (See chapters 2 and 5, this volume.) 
How might our understanding of implicit bias and its construct change when we think about it in 
this domain? 
In section three we were introduced to the difference in direct and indirect measures. In section 
four we made the decision to call whatever gives rise to results on indirect measures an implicit 
construct, and whatever gives rise to the results of direct measures an explicit construct. How do 
these constructs relate to what we intend to pick out with the terms “implicit bias” and “explicit 
bias”? What other ways might we define “implicit bias” and “explicit bias”? Do these definitions 
presuppose aspects of a psychological theory that we might want to avoid? 
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It is sometimes argued that a psychological theory that uses psychological states and processes 
with which we’re already familiar is better than a psychological theory that posits entirely new 
states and processes—call this the principle of parsimony. What are reasons for adopting the 
principle of parsimony? Of the various theories of implicit bias that we’ve looked at, which 
would the principle of parsimony cause us to prefer? How do we balance maximizing the 
principle of parsimony with the complexity of data?  
Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman are famous for work demonstrating that the 
human mind is prone to adopt a wide-variety of shortcuts and heuristics (see chapter 4 for more 
on the view of biases as “shortcuts”). They argue that the mind is composed of two distinct 
“systems”: system one involves the many mental shortcuts and is responsible for our fast, 
automatic behaviors while system two involves more rational processes and is responsible for 
our slow, deliberate behaviors. How does this picture fit with the theories of implicit biases that 
we’ve been discussing? What implications might this have for the existence of other implicit 
constructs outside of the social domain? How might this change the way we theorize about the 
psychology of bias? 













Web Resources (podcasts videos, movies): 
ONLINE RESOURCES 
• Harvard’s Project Implicit, which hosts online versions of the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT). Found at: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (IAT Test) 
• Buster Benson’s “Cognitive Bias Cheat Sheet”. Found at: https://
betterhumans.coach.me/cognitive-bias-cheat-sheet-55a472476b18 
PODCASTS 
• David McRaney. You Are Not So Smart. Available at: https://youarenotsosmart.com/
podcast/- A Podcast about unconscious mental reasoning and biases in thought. 
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• Alix Spiegel. “The Culture Inside” Invisibilia.  National Public Radio, Season 3, 




Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind  (a movie depicting how our mental representations in the 
form of memories can sometimes represent the world inaccurately or impartially, how they relate 
to emotion, and how that affects our actions) 
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